This essay examines and criticizes G. A. Cohen's interpretation of Marx's materialistic conception of history as presented in Cohen's book Karl Marx's Theory of History. In particular, the author attacks Cohen's Primacy Thesis, the claim that (for Marx) human technology is the primary explanatory factor for economic and social change and for historical development generally. The focus of the attack is Cohen's way of distinguishing between the material and social characteristics, or the content and form, of a system of production. (...) The argument is that Cohen's distinctions are defective and therefore fail to provide adequate support for the Primacy Thesis and that, moreover, the position that Cohen defends is not Marx's. (shrink)

The basic argument of this paper is that Feuerbach’s “materialist critique” of Hegel’s speculative philosophy was misguided, and that the source of some of Feuerbach’s confusions about Hegel lie in the former’s early discipleship of the latter. In particular, I examine certain purported Hegelian themes in Feuerbach’s critique of Hegel and argue that they are distortions of Hegel’s views. Next I explore two stages in Feuerbach’s critique of Hegel, the first dealing largely with the issue of presuppositions and starting points (...) in philosophy, and the second concerning the transformative method by which Feuerbach “inverts” Hegel’s philosophy. In the first case I argue that Feuerbach’s critique of Hegel is really only a self-critique, and in the second that his subject-predicate analysis of the relation of thought and being is incoherent. Finally, I offer an interpretation of Hegel’s speculative logic which views it as non-mystifying. (shrink)

Top scholars address Hegel’s History of Philosophy.

The thesis of this study is that the methodology in Marx that is appropriate for viewing socio-historical development in a structured framework, and also for capturing the dynamic role of practice in history, is one which goes beyond the ordinary traditional methods of empirical science and which has its roots in Hegel’s system of philosophy. In my view, the mistake of the traditional Marxist handling of Hegel lies in the attempt to divorce his method from his system, with the aim (...) of salvaging a dialectics that could be wedded to a philosophical materialism. However, Marx’s own statement of his opposition to Hegel did not imply the rejection of a systematically controlled form of explanation but instead was aimed at Hegel’s method in order to criticize its particular systematic standpoint as expressed in the self-legitimating “Idea.” Properly understood, the inversion of Hegel, this placing of Hegel “on his feet,” leads not to a “dialectical materialism,” which ostensibly substitutes the material for the ideal as the concern of dialectics, but rather results in the grounding of the ideal in the critical endeavor of political economy, as opposed to what Marx saw as Hegel’s uncritical enterprise of a cultural ideology. (shrink)

While Hegel scholars overall have acknowledged that the concept of Geist (Spirit or Mind) is central to Hegel’s comprehension of history, there is some degree of controversy among commentators concerning the interpretation of this concept. Lack of clarity about whether the principles Hegel presents fall on the speculative or on the historical level can result in charges of mystification. In this essay I attempt to clarify the concept of Geist by 1) defining the speculative transcendental meaning of Geist , which (...) will involve articulating the principles that structure Geist ’s essential features, especially as presented in Hegel’s Logic; 2) explicating the historical and existential dimension of Geist , which will focus on the nature of its action and embodiment, specifically attending to the nation state as the true historical individual, and 3) explaining the essential connection between the speculative and the historical in such a way as to address their dialectical unity in difference, and thus to alleviate the problem of ontology overcoming Geist ’s temporality. (shrink)

This book attempts to articulate the role of Hegelian dialectical logic in Marx’s Capital and to defend Marx against certain Hegelian critics, most notably Klaus Hartmann, who has systematically criticized Marx’s theory of capitalism, and Richard Winfield. According to Smith, the role of dialectical logic in Marx’s Capital has been underappreciated and little explored, which deals throughout with Marx’s use of Hegel’s dialectical logic in the critique of political economy). Moreover, Smith is concerned with establishing why Marx “needed” to employ (...) dialectical logic and the full extent of the Hegelian legacy here. We are told, initially, that dialectical logic was important for Marx in order to establish his categories of reflection, to develop his theory of fetishism, to present strong claims of necessity, and to ground revolutionary politics. These issues are addressed at various places in the book. (shrink)

This book attempts to articulate the role of Hegelian dialectical logic in Marx’s Capital and to defend Marx against certain Hegelian critics, most notably Klaus Hartmann, who has systematically criticized Marx’s theory of capitalism, and Richard Winfield. According to Smith, the role of dialectical logic in Marx’s Capital has been underappreciated and little explored, which deals throughout with Marx’s use of Hegel’s dialectical logic in the critique of political economy). Moreover, Smith is concerned with establishing why Marx “needed” to employ (...) dialectical logic and the full extent of the Hegelian legacy here. We are told, initially, that dialectical logic was important for Marx in order to establish his categories of reflection, to develop his theory of fetishism, to present strong claims of necessity, and to ground revolutionary politics. These issues are addressed at various places in the book. (shrink)